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Description of deliverable 
Deliverable 1.3 reports on the adaptation to the baseline Cedefop Skills Forecast 2018 to 
better account for the impact of automation on jobs in Europe till 2030. Because the speed at 
which automation will penetrate industry sectors and affect occupations is uncertain, we use 
OECD data on the automation risk by occupation to develop a number of hypothetical, but 
realistic scenarios. The labour market outcomes of these scenarios will be reported in 
Deliverable 1.4, to be released end 2019.   
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1. Introduction 
Economic models predict that technological innovations such as robotics and artificial 
intelligence (AI) will have a profound impact on the economy and the labour market 
(Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018). Estimates for the automation risk of occupations range from 
47% (Frey & Osborne, 2017) to 9% (Arntz et al., 2016) and crucially depend on the task 
content of occupations, as routine tasks can easily be automated, but non-routine tasks are 
harder to automate (Autor, 2015). Despite the growing possibilities that AI offer to automate 
non-routine tasks, so called engineering bottlenecks are still expected to remain (see the 
discussion in Levels et al., 2019). One purpose of WP1 is to further develop our 
understanding and to create an evidence base of potential consequences of automation for 
European labour markets. The work carried out in this task combines the standard EU 
forecasting model for the labour market, and updated data of automation risks in the EU 
Member States.  
 
In this paper, we document the main line of our approach to quantifying the impact of 
technologies on labour. The basis for this exercise is the Cedefop Skills Forecast model 2018 
that offers quantitative projections of the future trends in employment by industry sector 
and occupational group using harmonized data and methodologies for all countries of Europe 
(Section 2). The novelty of our approach is twofold: 
• We further develop the Cedefop Skills Forecast model to make it a unique tool for 
forecasting the impact of technologies on labour in a way that is comparable across 
countries of Europe.  
• We develop a range of plausible scenarios of automation to account for the fact that 
the development, deployment, and adoption of new technologies is characterised by 
substantial uncertainties (Section 3). This allows us to be the first to assess the 
potential consequences of technologies for the labour market across realistic 
scenarios. A qualitative judgement of the relative likelihood of different scenarios can 
then be applied.  
The details of the approach and the outcomes of this exercise will be published in December 
2019. An uncertainty we will not be able to address with the model, is how new technologies 
affect the nature or task content of jobs (Levels et al., 2019). This is because it is rather 
hazardous and speculative to try to quantify the job creation potential of technologies 
(Section 4). 
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2. Baseline forecasts 
The baseline labour market forecast used is the Cedefop Skills Forecast 2018 (see Cedefop, 
2018b, Cedefop, 2018c, Cedefop, Eurofound, 2018), hereafter Cedefop forecast. The 
Cedefop forecast chiefly relies on data published by Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) and 
provides data of the current structure, and future trends, of the EU labour market. The 
development of the Cedefop forecast employs seven modules to forecast demand and supply 
of labour disaggregated by sector, occupation, and qualification level (see Figure 1).  Briefly, 
the main elements of the approach are:  
1. demand side of the economy 
2. supply side of the labour market: number and characteristics of the economically 
active, including skills and qualifications 
3. imbalances, comparing demand and supply side modules, and reconciliation  
The chosen time horizon for this analysis is 2030. Forecasting for further time horizons entails 
a higher risk of economic and policy uncertainties. 
The baseline forecasts make no specific assumptions about how automation affects (future) 
employment demand. Automation, of course, affected past employment demand in the data 
we use as input through various mechanisms, and this is reflected in the baseline forecasts. 
Workplace technologies are typically designed to substitute workers for capital, leading to a 
decline in the demand for labour (substitution effect). However, there are several 
countervailing economic forces that can compensate for the initial labour-saving impact of 
the adoption of technologies. For example, automation can reduce the prices of goods and 
services, which can in turn increase the demand for products and labour. Moreover, 
technologies can be productivity enhancing, thereby increasing the demand for workers who 
perform tasks that complement such technologies. 
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Source: Cedefop, Eurofound (2018, p.15). 
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3. Scenario design 
Automation risk 
A body of literature has built upon Frey and Osbourne’s (2017) seminal estimation of the 
automation risk of occupations.  However, literature suggests the automation risk of 
occupations crucially depends on the task composition of these occupations (Autor, 2015). To 
account for this, our forecasting models use automation risk data estimated by the OECD 
(Nedelkoska & Quintini, 2018) that was provided to us for this H2020 project. The source 
data provides 2-digits ISCO occupation-level automation risk for 20 EU Member States. 
Specifically, the data provide the share of each workers in each occupation at risk of 
automation, by three categories: high (>70%), significant (50-70%), and low (<50%). For EU 
Member States not covered by the OECD data, we computed the EU average in the data for 
each occupation and imputed this when data was missing. 
Technology potential 
The basis of developing scenarios in this work is to select plausible ranges for modelling 
parameters, given the factors which affect the pace and extent of automation. From the 
conception of a given technology, there is a significant journey to its full economic 
exploitation. Once a general-purpose technology is ‘discovered’, commercial applications are 
developed. Commercial applications will only be exploited once it is profitable to do so. After 
initial application, technology takes substantial time to reach its full potential. There are three 
broad categories of factors to consider: technological, economic, and socio-political.  
In terms of the mechanics of applying automation risk data to the Cedefop forecast, we 
distinguish between the ‘technology potential’ parameter and the ‘deployment potential’ 
parameter. The ‘technology potential’ parameter captures uncertainty in the estimation of 
automation risk. This parameter concerns only technological potential and is time invariant. 
The ‘deployment potential’ parameter controls the maximum realisation, each year, of the 
technological automation potential. This parameter captures developments of commercial 
solutions, economic feasibility, and aspects of the socio-political dimension. This parameter is 
relaxed over time. 
A range of parameter values are used across scenarios to explore central and boundary 
scenarios: 
1. The ‘technology potential’ parameter falls within the automation risk range as 
estimated by Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018). That is, for jobs that Nedelkoska 
and Quintini (2018) identify in the ‘high risk’ category, the chance of automation is 
greater than 70%. This means that the maximum realisation is in the range 70-
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100%. In the scenarios we use the lower bound, midpoint, and upper bound of 
the automation risk range: for the high risk category, this is 70%, 85%, and 
100%respectively. 
2. The ‘deployment potential’ parameter is set such that full technology-potential is 
realised by either 2035, 2055, or 2075 to reflect different speeds of technology 
adoption. The parameter is relaxed linearly from zero to one between 2020 and 
these years. 
Policy scenarios 
In the above-described scenarios we assume that the ‘deployment potential’ parameter 
evolves linearly within the forecasting period. However, the speed at which automation 
penetrates in EU countries, industry sectors and occupations will depend on at least two 
factors: Member States’ employment protection legislation, and industry sectors’ exposure 
to competition: 
1. Employment protection legislation (EPL): in countries where employment 
protection legislation is tight, it is more difficult for firms to displace workers and 
replace them by machines. We normalize OECD’s EPL indicator 
(https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotectio
n.htm). We restrict annual automation to new job opportunities in countries in 
which there are relocation conditions for redundancy. This is to reflect the 
expected lower pace of deployment in countries with tight employment 
legislation. 
2. Competition: in industry sectors where price competition is high, firms will have to 
adopt new technologies to remain competitive. This will speed up the adoption of 
automation in sectors. We use industry-specific competitiveness by constructing 
trade intensity indicators, using E3ME data. We multiply the ‘deployment 
potential’ parameter by this index to reflect the expected faster pace of 
deployment in sectors that are highly competitive. 
 
4. Employment creation 
Although technological innovations are penetrating all industry sectors and replace labour 
inputs (Oxford Economics, 2019), technology also generates employment and increases 
productivity (Graetz & Michaels, 2018) such that the net effect on employment is unclear. 
There is evidence that automation so far has not resulted in a net loss of jobs (Autor & 
Salomons, 2018). In this exercise we will not provide a quantitative estimation of the job 
creation potential of automation since this is rather speculative and macro-empirical 
evidence on the link between technology and employment – that also considers labour-
enhancing mechanisms (e.g., indirect income and price compensation mechanisms) – is 
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scarce (Vivarelli, 2014). Levels et al. (2019) discuss the job creation potential of technological 
innovations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Technological innovations (robotics, artificial intelligence) are expected to profoundly impact 
the economy and the labour market, and one of the purposes of this H2020 project is to 
assess this impact. This paper documents the main line of our approach to quantifying the 
impact of technologies on labour. The novelty of our approach is that we build forth on 
existing Cedefop Skills Forecast model 2018 to 1) quantify the impact of technologies on 
labour in a way that is comparable across countries of Europe, and 2) develop a range of 
realistic scenarios to account for the fact that the development, deployment, and adoption of 
new technologies is characterised by substantial uncertainties. The labour market outcomes 
of these scenarios will be reported in Deliverable 1.4, to be released in December 2019.   
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